The trial was originally listed for hearing in January 2025 and was adjourned until April 2025 due to difficulties with the two witnesses being unable to attend the trial for cross-examination given certain travel restrictions each was under in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Both witnesses were prevented from giving evidence within the PRC because the PRC authorities do not permit evidence for foreign proceedings to be given remotely from within the PRC.

The Respondents’ witness was still subject to a travel restriction at the time of the adjourned trial in April, preventing him from leaving the PRC in order to give evidence either in Cayman Islands or by video-link from Hong Kong. The Respondents therefore applied for a second adjournment of the trial to afford the witness additional time within which to secure permission from the PRC authorities to travel outside of the PRC in order to be cross-examined.

The Court considered that the fundamental question on any application to adjourn a trial is whether refusal to adjourn would lead to an unfair hearing. If so, the hearing must be adjourned because the Court will not countenance an unfair hearing. Citing Hammer Foundation v Hammer International Foundation  the Court reiterated the principles governing its approach to an adjournment application:

1. The Court must engage in an evaluative assessment of all the material placed before it;
2. Fairness involves fairness to both parties - inconvenience is not a relevant countervailing factor and is usually not a reason on its own to refuse an adjournment unless there is truly uncompensatable injustice to the other party; and
3. In assessing what is fair, the Court will assess, inter alia, (i) the parties’ conduct and the reasons leading to the request for an adjournment, (ii) the extent to which the difficulties relied on in support of an adjournment can be overcome before the trial; (iii) whether there are specific matters that have arisen affecting the trial and whether they may be managed without losing the trial; and (iv) the consequences of an adjournment for the parties and for the Court.

The Court ultimately determined “with some hesitation” that fairness required the trial to be adjourned a second time, recognising what it described as “unfortunate bureaucracy” regarding the travel restrictions imposed on the Respondents’ principal witness and taking into consideration the potential impact on the Respondents’ position if its principal witness was unable to give oral evidence at trial. The Court however, warned the Respondents that its decision was a “last chance saloon” and awarded the Petitioner a wasted costs order.

The judgment is a helpful reminder of the principles the Court will consider when determining an adjournment application and the Court’s apparent reluctance to do so unless absolutely necessary. While the Court’s primary concern will be that of fairness, the Court repeatedly emphasised its hesitation in adjourning the trial for a second time - and that “something really out of the ordinary” would have to occur that would further delay the trial.